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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PEGGY B. ODAK,

)
)
)

Plaintiff/Appellee,
-vs-

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

)

PERRY D. ODAK,

)
)
)

Defendant/Appellant.

I.

Case No. 980133 CA
Priority No. 15

JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to §
78-2a-3(2)(i) Utah Code Annotated and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure as this is an appeal from a final order of
the district court denying Appellant's motion for a contempt order.

II.

1.
evidentiary

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Did the district court commit error in making
finding

of

fact

that

Appellant

had

not

an

proven

defamation by a preponderance of the evidence without allowing the
parties to present any evidence?

2.

Did the district court commit error by

implicitly

requiring Appellant to prove defamation rather than denigration
which was the conduct prohibited by the Decree of Divorce?
These issues are purely issues of law which are reviewed
for correctness.

See, Drake v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 939 P.2d

177, 181 (Utah 1997).

III.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Course of Proceedings Below.

On February 18, 1992, Plaintiff/Appellee
("Mrs.

Odak")

filed

Defendant/Appellant

Perry

a

complaint
D.

Odak

("Mr.

District Court for Summit County, Utah.

for

Peggy D. Odak

divorce

Odak")
[R. 1-3]

in

against
the

On April 8,

1992, a Decree of Divorce was entered between the parties.
198-214]

Third

[R.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, Mr. Odak was required

to pay Mrs. Odak spousal support in the amount of no less than
$5,000.00 per month from April, 1992 through March, 1999.

[R. 205-

206] . Mr. Odak was also obligated to indemnify Mrs. Odak from any
liability on a possible claim by the Internal Revenue Service (the
"IRS") on the parties' joint 1983 federal income tax return for
$290,346.00 of allegedly improper interest deductions relating to
the purchase

of

a Pinnacle

condominium

in Deer Valley,

Utah,

although the parties believed it was unlikely the IRS would pursue
such a claim.

[R. 200-201, 267-68]
2

In 1993, the IRS levied a claim in excess of $700,000.00
against the parties with respect to their joint tax return for
1983.

[R. 268]

Mr. Odak retained counsel and commenced a legal

challenge to the levy which took several years to successfully
resolve.

Commencing in 1995, the IRS began garnishing all but

$533.33 of the monthly spousal support payments due from Mr. Odak
to Mrs. Odak.

[R. 268-69, 328-29]

Further, the IRS would not

allow Mr. Odak to make any additional payments to Mrs. Odak until
the purported tax obligation was satisfied.

[R. 268-69]

In June, 1995, Mrs. Odak filed a motion for an order to
show cause why Mr. Odak should not be held in contempt of court for
his failure to make the spousal support payments garnished by the
IRS.

[R. 216-17].

The matter was heard on October 23, 1995.

Judgment was entered against Mr. Odak for past spousal support in
the amount of $31,266.62 plus attorney's fees and other amounts.
No contempt order was entered.

[R. 306-07]

In October, 1996, Mrs. Odak noticed a hearing for November
12, 1996, seeking the entry of another judgment against Mr. Odak
for the amount of spousal support payments garnished by the IRS
since the date of the prior judgment.

Mrs. Odak also sought an

order holding Mr. Odak in contempt of court for his failure to make
the payments.
judgment

At the November

entered

against

12 hearing, the court

Mr. Odak

for the additional

ordered
spousal

support payments that had become due in the amount of $58,066.58
and for other amounts, but denied the motion for contempt on the
basis that Mr. Odak had not willfully failed to pay spousal support
3

payments.

The court ordered that in the event the judgments for

spousal support were not paid by April 30, 1997, that Mrs. Odak
could schedule an evidentiary hearing to further consider the issue
of contempt.

[R. 339-41]

The judgments for spousal support were not paid by Mr. Odak
by April 30, 1997 because of the continuing litigation with the
IRS.1

Accordingly, in April, 1997, Mrs. Odak noticed a hearing on

an order to show cause re contempt.

[R. 314]

In June, 1997, Mr. Odak filed two motions. First, Mr. Odak
filed a motion for a contempt order against Mrs. Odak for violating
the provision in the divorce decree prohibiting the parties from
denigrating
terminate

one another.
spousal

support

Second, Mr. Odak
based

cohabitation with another man.

upon

filed a motion to

Mrs.

Odak's

alleged

[R. 319-27]

All of these motions were heard by the Honorable Pat B.
Brian on October 30, 1997.

Judge Brian determined that he would

listen to brief offers of proof from counsel of the evidence the
parties were prepared to present and then determine whether he
wanted to hear evidence.

[R. 409]

The court did not hear any

evidence after receiving the offers of proof.

Instead, the court

immediately ruled, denying Mr. Odak's motion to terminate spousal
1

Mr. Odak's challenge of the IRS levy was ultimately
successful. After spending in excess of $100,000.00 in attorney's
fees and costs, Mr. Odak obtained a summary judgment against the
IRS in early 1997, determining that the IRS levy was wrongful and
that the taxes were not owed. The IRS filed an appeal, but then
dropped the appeal on or about September 1, 1997. As soon as the
summary judgment was obtained, Mr. Odak continued paying spousal
support to Mrs. Odak. The judgments for past spousal support were
also paid.
[R. 328-29, 412]
4

support based upon cohabitation; denying Mr. Odak's motion for a
contempt order against Mrs. Odak, but entering an order mutually
restraining the parties from denigrating each other; and granting
Mrs. Odak's motion for another judgment for spousal support, but
denying her motion to have Mr. Odak held in contempt of court.

[R.

381-84, 452-57]
On March 3, 1998, Mr. Odak filed a Notice of Appeal from
the court's order on his contempt motion.

B.

[R. 3 96]

Statement of Facts.

1. The Decree of Divorce entered April 8, 1992 between the
parties provided as follows:
13. It is ordered that the parties not in any
way denigrate each other publicly or privately so as
to
negatively
affect
each
other's
personal,
professional or business relations, harm each other's
professional reputations, or reduce each other's
earning power. [R. 212].
2.

At the October 30, 1997 hearing, the court proceeded on

Mr. Odak's motion for contempt for Mrs. Odak's alleged violation of
the denigration provision by taking offers
parties.

of proof

from

the

The court did not take any evidence at the hearing.

[R.

408-58]
3.

Mr. Odak proffered the following evidence concerning

Mrs. Odak's violation of paragraph 13 of the Divorce Decree:

Mr.

Odak had for many years been a top executive of a number of
substantial companies.

At the time of the hearing, he was and

still is the chief executive officer of Ben & Jerry's Homemade,
5

Inc., a public company.

It is very important that his personal and

professional reputation remain unsullied.

Mrs. Odak made a number

of false and defamatory statements to third parties concerning Mr.
Odak, including that (1) Mr. Odak was probably behind threats of
physical violence to her; (2) Mr. Odak is powerful and capable of
having people beat up or injured and every time something bad
happens to her she wonders if Mr. Odak is behind it; (3) if she is
killed

or

injured,

Mr.

Odak

did

it;

(4)

that

Mr.

Odak

is

vindictive, evil and dangerous; (5) Mr. Odak is conniving, devious,
pays off judges and witnesses and if Mrs. Odak is killed Mr. Odak
probably did it; and (6) Mr. Odak got Mrs. Odak's daughter-in-law
fired from her employment with a bank.
4.

[R. 424]

Despite the fact that the court did not allow the

parties to present any evidence, the court (although finding that
there was more than enough fault to be spread between the two
parties,

and

imposing

a

mutual

restraining

order

prohibiting

denigrating statements) mcde an evidentiary finding on the record
at the hearing that:
The question of defamation simply was not proved
by a preponderance of the evidence. And the Court
finds that's true with any allegation of contempt
asserted by both parties. [R. 453-54]
5.

The court subsequently entered an Order and Judgment,

determining in paragraph 6 that:
Similarly, with regard to tne Defendant's claim
that he has been defamed, although bad blood exists
between the parties, the Defendant has failed to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that he has been
defamed by the Plaintiff. [R. 382]

6

6.

At the time the motion for contempt was heard by the

court, a separate lawsuit for defamation filed by Mr. Odak against
Mrs. Odak was pending in Ohio where Mrs. Odak resides.
7.

[R. 4 54]

After the court's order was entered purporting to find

that Mr. Odak had not proven defamation by a preponderance of the
evidence, Mrs. Odak filed a motion for summary judgment in the Ohio
action, asserting that Judge Brian's ruling that Mr. Odak had not
proven defamation by a preponderance

of

the evidence was

res

judicata with respect to Mr. Odak's defamation lawsuit in Ohio.
The Ohio court agreed, and entered summary judgment dismissing Mr.
Odak's defamation claim in Ohio.

Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah

Rules of Evidence, Mr. Odak requests that the Court take judicial
notice of that decision, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Appendix B.

IV.

A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Defendant/Appellant Perry D. Odak filed a motion for a

contempt order below against Plaintiff/Appellee Peggy B. Odak on
the basis that she had violated the Decree of Divorce between the
parties by denigrating Mr. Odak.

The court informed the parties

that it would proceed to hear offers of proof from the parties and
then decide if it wanted to hear any evidence before the court made
its decision.

Mr. Odak then made an offer of proof which was

sufficient to show that Mrs. Odak had denigrated him in violation
of

the

divorce

decree.

The

court
7

nevertheless

erroneously

proceeded to make a factual determination that Mr. Odak had not
proven

defamation

by a preponderance

of

the

evidence

without

allowing the parties to present testimony on which such a finding
could properly be based.
B.

The court erred in implicitly requiring Mr. Odak to

prove defamation rather than denigration which was the conduct
prohibited by the divorce decree.

The finding should therefore be

set aside.

V.

A.

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY MAKING AN EVIDENTIARY

FINDING THAT MR. ODAK HAD NOT PROVEN DEFAMATION BY A PREPONDERANCE
OF

THE

EVIDENCE

WITHOUT

ALLOWING

THE

PARTIES

TO

PRESENT

ANY

TESTIMONY ON THE ISSUE.

The district court did not permit any testimony on whether
Mrs. Odak had violated the divorce decree by denigrating Mr. Odak.
Instead, the court informed the parties it would take offers of
proof

and

evidence.

then

decide

The

court

whether

the

committed

court

clear

wanted

error

in

to

hear

deciding

any
an

evidentiary matter which was the subject of disputed offers of
proof without hearing any testimony.

An offer of proof does not

constitute evidence that can support a finding of fact.

See, Tisco

Intermountain v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 744 P.2d 1340, 1342
(Utah 1987) ; Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 579 P. 2d 1251
8

(Nev. 1978) . It was fundamentally unfair for the court to find no
defamation without allowing testimony to be presented.
Mr. Odak's offer of proof was that Mrs. Odak had told other
people that Mr. Odak was probably behind

threats of physical

violence to her; that Mr. Odak is a very powerful person and is
capable of having people beat up or injured and that every time
something bad happens she wonders if Mr. Odak is behind it; that if
she

is killed

vindictive,

or

evil

injured Mr. Odak did
and

dangerous;

that

it; that Mr. Odak

Mr.

Odak

is

is

conniving,

devious, pays off judges and witnesses; that if she is killed Mr.
Odak probably did it and that Mr. Odak got her daughter-in-law
fired from her employment with a bank.
sufficient to show defamation.2

This offer of proof was

It was clear error for the court

to rule against Mr. Odak on this issue without permitting any
evidence to be presented.
The issue of whether Mr. Odak proved defamation by Mrs.
Odak is not academic.

Mrs. Odak utilized that finding in order to

short-circuit Mr. Odak's defamation lawsuit in Ohio.

Mrs. Odak

obtained summary judgment dismissing the Ohio lawsuit on the basis
that Judge Brian's finding of no defamation was res judicata with
respect to the defamation claims made in the Ohio lawsuit.
2

Thus,

Mr. Odak was not required to prove monetary damages to
enforce the decree. However, even if he were otherwise required to
do so, these statements are defamatory per se because they accuse
Mr. Odak of criminal conduct and therefore damage is presumed.
See, Baum v. Gillman, 667 P.2d 41 (Utah 1983); Allred v. Cook, 590
P.2d 318, 320-21 (Utah 1979) . Moreover, Mr. Odak was not required
to prove these statements were false.
Truth is an affirmative
defense which the defendant has the burden of proving. See, Auto
West, Inc. v. Baggs, 678 P.2d 286, 290 (Utah 1984).
9

the net effect of Judge Brian's ruling was to deprive Mr. Odak of
his day in court in his defamation lawsuit in Ohio, as well as on
his contempt motion in the present case.

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IMPLICITLY REQUIRING PROOF

OF DEFAMATION RATHER THAN DENIGRATION.

Mr. Odak was not required to prove the tort of defamation
in order to enforce the provisions of the Decree of Divorce.
decree was more broad.
any

way

denigrate

[Emphasis added].

The

The decree ordered the parties to "not in

each

other

publicly

or

privately

"Denigrate" is defined as follows:

.

.

."

"to cast

aspersions on: defame . . . to deny the importance or validity of:
BELITTLE. . . "
Even
statements

if
did

[Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1989)] .
it
not

is assumed

for

technically

certainly denigrated Mr. Odak.

argument

constitute

that

Mrs.

Odak's

defamation,

they

The court's ruling which seemed to

require defamation instead of denigration was erroneous.

Because

the finding of lack of defamation was not required for the court's
decision, the finding should be set aside.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the district court's order should be reversed insofar as the
finding of no defamation is concerned and the case remanded to
10

district court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether
Mrs.

Odak

Divorce.

denigrated Mr. Odak

in violation

of

the Decree

In the alternative, the finding should be set aside.
DATED this

£jy-%ay of July, 1998.
BURBIDGE Sc MITCHELL

StepnenCfl". Mitchel.
Attorneys for Appellant
js odak\appeal\brief
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-00O00-

PEGGY B. ODAK,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.: 92-43-11354
Judge: Pat B. Brian

PERRY D. ODAK,
Defendant.
-00O00-

This matter came on for hearing on October 30, 1997, the Honorable Pat B. Brian
presiding. Both parties were present and represented by counsel. The Court having reviewed the
pleadings, and having heard the arguments and proffers of counsel, and being fully advised, now
makes and enters the following Findings and Orders:
1.

The Court finds that, as of October 31, 1997, there exist arrearages in the payment

of alimony not already reduced to judgment in the amount of $31,568.00. Plaintiff is granted
judgment against the Defendant in that amount, together with interest at the applicable prejudgment and post-judgment legal rate until paid in full.

feOl-hZ -i-* 11 s- '.L J * 8

0398

2.

Interest on the previously-entered judgments that has accrued should be calculated

by counsel, and judgment shall enter for all amounts due through October 31, 1997.
3.

The parties are mutually restrained from making defamatory or derogatory

comments about the other to any other person.
4.

The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence the existence of a cohabitation relationship between the Plaintiff and any other person.
5.

The issues of contempt raised by the respective parties are evidence that each bears

ill-will toward the other. Neither is more responsible than the other, and the Court finds that
neither has demonstrated contemptuous behavior of the other warranting judicial relief.
6.

Similarly, with regard to the Defendant's claim that he has been defamed, although

bad blood exists between the parties, the Defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he has been defamed by the Plaintiff.
7.

Although the Court believes that the Defendant's action in Ohio should be dismissed,

the Court recognizes that it does not have the jurisdiction to so order, and the Plaintiffs motion
in that regard is denied.
8.

Regarding the Plaintiffs claim for reimbursement for attorney's fees and costs, the

Court orders that all prior orders awarding attorneys fees remain intact. Plaintiff is awarded an
additional sum of $10,000.00 as a partial contribution toward her fees and costs. However, if the
Defendant pays all judgments for alimony arrearages, interest, and attorney's fees accrued to date
on or before December 1, 1997, the award of $10,000.00 of fees will be rescinded, and the parties
will be ordered to bear all of their own fees and costs not otherwise reduced to Judgment.
2

0899

9.

The Court finds that it would be reasonable for the Plaintiff to refrain from pursuing

execution proceedings in the State of Vermont until December 1, 1997.

DATED t h i s / Z . day of

~[<?^s}//^Jt/

. 1998.

BY THE COURT:
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Approved as to form:

Stephen B. Mitchell
Attorney for Defendant
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COURT

CQWTS

IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF HURON COUNTY, OHIO
PERRY D. OKAK,

)

Case No. CVH-97-471

)

JUDGE EARL R. McGIMPSEY

)

DECISION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY

Plaintiff
vs.
PEGGY B. OKAK,
Defendant
)

DECISION

^'-^^^^JJ^S

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant Peggy Odak's Motion for
Summary Judgment
It does not appear to the Court that the facts are in dispute, but rather the legal
consequences of those facts. The parties were divorced in Utah in 1992. There have been
continuing post-decree proceedings in the Utah court, including a motion by Perry Odak
for a contempt order against Peggy Odak for allegedly violating a provision of the divorce
decree prohibiting the parties from making slanderous statements about each other. Perry
Odak contemporaneously filed this tort defamation action in Ohio. The alleged slanderous
statements were the same statements used as a basis for both the injunctive relief sought
in the Utah court and the damages sought in this court. Perry Odak has not argued to this
Court that there were separate and distinct slanderous statements that formed separate bases
for the respective actions. On October 30,1997, the Utah court conducted a hearing on the
claim that Peggy Odak was slandering Perry Odak and thereafter on February 17, 1998,
entered an Order and Judgment finding "with regard to Defendant's [Perry Odak] claim that
he has been defamed . . . the Defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he has been defamed by the Plaintiff [Peggy Odak]." An appeal of the Utah
court's judgment is pending. Peggy Odak seeks herein to have Perry Odak's tort action
dismissed on the basis that the Utah court's Order and Judgment of February 17, 1998, is
res judicata of the defamation issue pending in this case.
The Utah court's judgment is a final judgment for purposes of the doctrine of res
judicata. Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno Utah App. (1987), 735 P.2d 387, 390.
As such it is entitled to the full, faith and credit of this Court and is not subject to collateral
attack. Litsinger Sign Co. V. American sign Co. (1967), 11 Ohio St. 2d 1; see 63 Ohio Jur.
3d Judgments, Section 352 at 125-126. The issue raised by this motion for summary
-1-

judgment is whether the determination of the defamation issue for purposes of the
enforcement of the divorce decree is res judicata for purposes of this tort action.
This issue is answered by the holding in Grava v. Parkman Twp.( 1995), 73 Ohio
St. 3d 379, 382 - 383, wherein the court stated:
Today, we expressly adhere to the modern application of the
doctrine of res judicata, as stated in 1 Restatement of the Law 2d,
Judgments (1982), Sections 24-25, and hold that a valid, final judgment
rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of
the previous action. Therefore, we overrule the second paragraph of the
syllabus in Norwood, supra, and overrule the second paragraph of the
syllabus in Whitehead, supra, to the extent it is inconsistent with today's
holding.
Section 24(1) of the Restatement of Judgments, supra, at 196,
provides: "When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action
extinguishes the plaintiff s claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar * *
*, the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or
series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose." See, also,
46 American Jurisprudence 2d, supra, at Sections 516 and 533. Comment
b to Section 24 of the Restatement of Judgments, supra, at 198-199, defines
a "transaction" as a "common nucleus of operative facts." Comment c to
Section 24, at 200, plainly states: "That a number of different legal theories
casting liability on an actor may apply to a given episode does not create
multiple transactions and hence multiple claims. This remains true although
the several legal theories depend on different shadings of the facts, or
would emphasize different elements of the facts, or would call for different
measures of liability or different kinds of relief."
Section 25 of the Restatement of Judgments, supra, at 209, further
explains: "The rule of § 24 applies to extinguish a claim by the plaintiff
against the defendant even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second
action (1) To present evidence or grounds or theories of the case not
presented in the first action, or (2) To seek remedies or forms of relief not
demanded in the first action." (Emphasis added.) See, also, 46 American
Jurisprudence 2d, supra, at Sections 535 and 537. The rationale for such a
rule is aptly stated in Comment a to Section 24 of the Restatement of
Judgments, supra, at 196-197:" [I]n the days when civil procedure still bore
the imprint of the forms of action and the division between law and equity,
the courts were prone to associate claim with a single theory of recovery,
so that, with respect to one transaction, a plaintiff might have as many
claims as there were theories of the substantive law upon which he could
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seek relief against the defendant. Thus, defeated in an action based on one
theory, the plaintiff might be able to maintain another action based on a
different theory, even though both actions were grounded upon the
defendant's identical act or connected acts forming a single life-situation.
* * * The present trend is to see claim in factual terms and to make it
coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of substantive
theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be
available to the plaintiff * * *; regardless of the variations in the evidence
needed to support the theories or rights." (Emphasis added.)
We hold that Grava's second application for a zoning certificate is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Grava's second application is based
on a claim arising from a nucleus of facts that was the subject matter of his
first application. In both instances, Grava was attempting to construct
exactly the same building on the same tract of land, which had fewer acres
than Section 404.4 of the local zoning ordinance required. In fact, the only
difference between the two applications is the theory of substantive law
under which Grava sought relief.
In Grava v. Parkman Twp. Grava had argued, as Perry Odak argues here, that his second
action sought different relief. Grava claimed "the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the
present action concerning his second application for a zoning certificate because this action
involves a distinctly different method of obtaining relief than the previous action involving
his first application. He argues that the facts necessary to obtain relief under Section 906.0
are different from the facts necessary to obtain a variance." [Footnote omitted.] 73 Ohio
St. 3dat381-382. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected Grava's argument as this Court must
reject Mr. Odak's argument.
In this case the issue of defamation in this case arises out of the same nucleus of
facts that was the subject matter of Perry Odak's contempt action for slander in the Utah
court. The fact that he seeks a different remedy here is of no consequence. The fact that
he chose not to present his case more fully in the Utah court is not a matter that can be
considered by this Court, just as this Court cannot review the merits of the Utah court's
decision. The doctrine of res judicata bars Mr. Odak's action herein and Peggy Odak's
motion for summary judgment must, therefore, be granted.

JUDGMENT ENTRY
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant
Peggy Odak's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, Plaintiffs complaint is
dismissed with prejudice and costs are taxed to Plaintiff.

JUDGE EARL R. McGIMPSEY
cc: James A. Laurenson, Esq.
Charles M. Rosenberg, Esq.
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